The Politics of Delusion Have Taken Hold

The Politics of Delusion Have Taken Hold

By Thomas Edsall

These excerpts from Edsall’s New York Times essay., The Politics of Delusion Have Taken Hold, The language is his except where indicated. Following these excerpts, I post a comment. Posted in Political/Partisan Divide

“Matters of status and identity are easy to whip up into existential conflicts with zero-sum solutions. To the extent that political leaders are encouraging people to focus on threats to their social status rather than their economic or material well-being, they are certainly directing attention in an unhelpful and often dangerous direction. It’s much easier to think of others as disproportionately dangerous and extreme when their victory means your loss, rather than focusing on the overall well-being of the nation as a whole.” (Lilliana Mason)

what scholars variously describe as misperception and even delusion is driving up the intensity of Wontemporary partisan hostility.

 “A substantial proportion of partisans are willing to directly say that they view members of the opposing party as less evolved than supporters of their own party.” (James L. Martherus, et al)

On a 100-point “ascent of man” scale. both Democrats and Republicans placed members of the opposition more than 30 points lower on the scale than members of their own party.

“...These gaps are more than twice the dehumanization differences found … for Muslims, 14 points, and nearly four times the gap for Mexican immigrants, 7.9 points,” (James L. Martherus, et al)

Support for political violence correlated with a combination of white identity, belief in extreme religions and conspiracy thinking.

Americans’ views of the other party are in fact driven by misperceptions and falsehoods.” Bringing Republicans and Democrats together and revealing their commonalities, she continued, “only lessens affective polarization. It cannot eliminate it.” (Julie Wronski,)

“Because humans are innately good at finding patterns and establishing stereotypes, (Julie Wronski,)

Since these beliefs have their foundations in core values, self-image and group identities, Wronski wrote, “people are motivated to defend them. Protecting your identity becomes more important than embracing the truth.”

Misperceptions and delusions interact dangerously with core political and moral disagreements.

Extreme, emotionally driven polarization:

“America’s relatively rigid, two-party electoral system stands apart by collapsing a wide range of legitimate social and political debates into a singular battle line... the competition becomes cutthroat, and politics begins to feel zero-sum, where one side’s gain is inherently the other’s loss.” (Michael Dimock)

“Various types of identities have become ‘stacked’ on top of people’s partisan identities. Race, religion and ideology now align with partisan identity in ways that they often didn’t in eras when the two parties were relatively heterogenous coalitions. The result is that an individual whose party loses on Election Day can feel that his or her identity has suffered a defeat.” (Michael Dimock)

Majorities of both parties viewed the opposition as immoral, dishonest, closed-minded and unintelligent — judgments that grew even more adverse, by 13 to 28 points, from 2016 to 2022.

“Americans misperceive the extent of policy disagreement, antidemocratic attitudes, support for political violence, dehumanization of rival partisans “(Robb Willer)

“These misperceptions...really matter.”  (Robb Willer)

“Democrats and Republicans don’t want to bring a knife to a gunfight; they greatly overestimate how much their rivals want to break norms of nonviolent, democratic engagement, and this leads Democrats and Republicans to support violent and undemocratic engagement more than they otherwise would.” (Willer)

“...situations believed to be real can become real in their consequences. It is likely that Democrats’ and Republicans’ inaccurate, overly negative stereotypes of one another are to some extent self-fulfilling, leading partisans to adopt more divisive, conflictual views than they would if they saw each other more accurately.” (Willer)

“...simply fearing that opposing partisans support democratic backsliding can lead individuals to support it themselves.” (Alia Braley)

“...people are, in fact, operating under a delusion that everyday opposing partisans are willing to undermine democracy. “ (Braley)

Partisans, Braley continued “overestimate how much members of the other party dislike and dehumanize them. Partisans tend to believe members of the other party want far more extreme policy outcomes than they actually do.” These misperceptions “can create a type of downward spiral in terms of polarization,” 

“The result is a state of mutual fear.” (Braley)

“Fear is tried and true… If I’m only partially convinced that Democrats intend to steal the next election or want to murder babies, that partial belief may still be enough to get me to act…. Misperceiving that the other side no longer supports democracy, however, is a more direct threat to democracy... it leads your own side to no longer support democracy to the same degree." (Gabriel Lenz)

“(Partisans explain opponents with accusations of) selfishness, ignorance, hatred and other negative motives… Even one bad apple appears to spoil the whole bunch.” Affective polarization can … take on a momentum of its own: "Such a feedback loop leads citizens to perceive themselves as increasingly surrounded by monsters.” (Sean Freeder”

There are other problems with efforts to lessen the mutual disdain of Democrats and Republicans. “Fact-checks were more likely to backfire when they came from a political out-group member...leaving people with more entrenched beliefs in misinformation... Corrections are effective on average but have small effects compared to partisan identity congruence and sometimes backfire.” (Diego A. Reinero)

The rise of contemporary affective polarization is a distinctly 21st-century phenomenon. “the share of...partisans expressing extreme negativity for the out-party increased dramatically — from 8 percent in 2000 to 40 percent in 2020. (Shanto Iyengar and Matthew Tyler)

“partisans seek out information with congenial slant and sincerely adopt inaccurate beliefs that cast their party in a favorable light.” Today, Iyengar wrote, not only are there more sources of information, but also “partisans have ample opportunity to tune in to ‘congenial sources.’” (Erik Peterson and Iyengar )

“The critical question is usually whether the truth is relevant or not… Partisan polarization resembles religious polarization. Attempting to ‘disprove’ someone’s long-held religion will rarely do much to convince them that your god is the right one. (Partisan affiliation is an identity) and displays dynamics familiar to identity politics… People root for their team, and they find facts or other narratives to justify doing so. Remember, most people do not spend a lot of time thinking about politics. When they do so, their attitudes grow out of other affinities they have developed over time from signals sent by trusted elites or friendship networks.” (Nathaniel Persily)

“A good chunk of affective polarization is delusion or based on misperceptions. For instance, people have exaggerated stereotypes about the other party (and what members of the other party think of them), and when you correct those false perceptions, they quickly become less hostile… (People are motivated) to affirm evidence that confirms their beliefs and affirms their identities. For committed partisans, they are often more motivated by these social goals than the desire to be accurate. People also share misinformation for social reasons — it can signal loyalty and help people gain status in some partisan communities. (A significant component) is based on misperceptions they’ve absorbed from their social network on (social) media stories. It suggests that if we could simply provide accurate and diverse portrayals of other groups, it might reduce the growing trend toward affective polarization. (But) correcting misinformation is extremely hard; the impact tends to be pretty small in the political domain, and the effects don’t last long.” (Jay Van Bavel)

“People prefer news that allows them to believe positive things about political in-group members and negative things about political out-group members… Democrats and Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their in-group or the value-undermining behavior of their out-group.” (Andrea Pereira, Elizabeth Harris and Van Bavel)

“Three depolarization interventions reliably reduced self-reported affective polarization,” (but) the interventions “did not reliably reduce any of three measures of antidemocratic attitudes: support for undemocratic candidates, support for partisan violence and prioritizing partisan ends over democratic means.” (Jan G. Voelkel, et al)

In other words, the irrational element of partisan hostility has seemingly created a political culture resistant to correction or reform. If so, the nation is stuck, at least for the time being, in a destructive cyclical pattern that no one so far has found a way to escape…. The nation … struggles to restore sanity to American politics — if it’s not too late.

My Comment:

What strikes me most is how this research supports this website’s central thesis: our primary problem is the System that teaches people to climb social ladders and look down on and dominate and exploit those below. Our society’s driving force is the quest for relatively higher status and the formation of self-identities rooted in that status. Confronting this reality head-on and cultivating an egalitarian culture that nurtures mutual respect for everyone's essential equality is key to changing this dynamic. How best to do so is another question that’s not easily answered.

The following passages relate to this theme: 

  • Focus on threats to their social status.

  • Since these beliefs have their foundations in core values, self-image and group identities, Wronski wrote, “people are motivated to defend them.

  • Protecting your identity becomes more important than embracing the truth.

  • Various types of identities have become ‘stacked’ on top of people’s partisan identities.

  • Feel that his or her identity has suffered a defeat.

  • Fact checks were more likely to backfire… The critical question is usually whether the truth is relevant or not…

  • Partisan polarization resembles religious polarization.... 

  • People root for their team, and they find facts or other narratives to justify doing so.

  • (People are motivated) to affirm evidence that confirms their beliefs and affirms their identities

  • For committed partisans, they are often more motivated by these social goals than the desire to be accurate.... it can signal loyalty and help people gain status in some partisan communities.

  • People prefer news that allows them to believe positive things about political in-group members and negative things about political out-group members…